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Abstract. In recent decades, financial liberalization has been one of the most important 
strategies for Asian countries to promote growth. However, debate emerges following 
several financial crises on whether liberalizing financial markets and allowing for free 
access to international capital markets, would benefit or impede economic development. 
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of financial openness on select 
seventeen Asian economies and answer the three questions: 1. Is there any linkage between 
financial openness and economic growth for these seventeen Asian countries? 2. Does any 
of the financial openness pose positive or negative effects? 3. If no direct impact revealed, 
can financial openness still have growth effect under certain fundamental or institutional 
conditions? Our main findings are as follows: 1. By employing both de jure and de facto 
indicators of financial openness, our empirical results indicate that the de facto indicators 
are associated with growth of Asian economies but de jure indicator does not show 
statistically significant impact on growth across three methodologies. 2.Furthermore, these 
growth effects vary among the de facto indicators. According to our empirical results, out 
of the four de facto financial openness measurements, only one of them, foreign direct 
investment inflows, influences growth positively whereas three other measures, including 
foreign direct investment outflows, portfolio investment inflows and outflows exert 
negative impact on growth. In terms of the view that the growth effect of the financial 
openness depends on macroeconomic foundations or institutional conditions of an 
economy, our findings do not support this view due to the estimation results are not robust 
across five financial openness proxies. 
Keywords. Financial Openness, Inward FDI, Outward FDI, Portfolio Assets, and Portfolio 
Liabilities 
JEL. F20, F21, F43. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Debates over the Effects of Financial Openness on Economic 
Growth 
Starting in the mid-80s, international financial liberalization has become a 
major policy prescription for countries to promote economic growth. In particular, 
developing and underdeveloped countries have embarked on financial opening 
policies by liberalizing their current and capital accounts, and deregulating 
international capital transactions. These countries have been opening up their 
financial markets to foreign investors and adjusting capital restrictions to attract 
international capital investments. China and India, for instance, have been easing 
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capital inflow controls by raising investment limits for foreign investors and 
allowing foreign financial institutions to access domestic capital markets. In 
addition to the liberalization of portfolio flows, most Asian countries have been 
reducing or lifting the restrictions on foreign direct investment by allowing cross-
border mergers and acquisitions, transnational business establishments, and 
foreign-owned domestic corporations across industries. This wave of global 
financial integration has thus resulted in a surge of cross-border capital flows 
among countries and regions. 
In theory, lifting capital restrictions should induce capital flows from rich to 
poor countries, thus accumulating capital for poor countries to spur growth. A 
broader range of financial liberalization includes liberalizing domestic financial 
markets, easing capital account restrictions, and further encouraging inflow and 
outflow of foreign investments among countries. The many benefits of 
liberalization include: facilitating risk-sharing, improving capital allocation 
efficiency, and strengthening financial market development. According to 
McKinnon(1973) and Shaw (1973), financial repression will lead to low savings, 
low credit rationing, less investment opportunities and inefficiency in capital 
allocation. Once financial restrictions are lifted by policymakers, economy would 
be stimulated through increases in saving and investment and thus promote 
growth.
2
 This capital reallocation will then benefit both capital rich and capital 
poor countries in that for capital rich economies, the return rate of savings will be 
driven up and investment risk will be reduced down due to diversification. For 
capital poor economies, more investment opportunities will be offered, 
employment rate will be improved, financial development will be promoted, and 
competition will be enhanced. 
However, there are also skeptics on the positive effects of financial 
liberalization on the economy. Devereux and Smith (1994) argue that international 
risk sharing will reduce saving and thus slow down growth.
3
 Stiglitz (2000) also 
questions the profitability of foreign capital due to information asymmetries, in that 
foreign investment might be riskier than investors expect from the lack of complete 
information
4
. Moreover, policy makers are often warned that international capital 
flows could cause financial market instability and macroeconomic volatility. 
Especially short term capital flows, which are subject to the rapid and frequent 
withdraws when an economy is in turmoil, are not associated with long term 
investment growth and will not contribute to long run economic development. 
Short -term capital flows often play influential roles during the time of crisis. 
Similarly, Jagdish Bhagwati (1998)
5
 finds that free capital mobility, leading to 
excessive short-term capital borrowings, was the main cause of the Asian crisis in 
1997. Asian economies, including Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, and 
the Philippines, have gained two folds of capital inflow from 1994 to 1996, and 
suffered from the sudden massive capital outflows prior to the crisis hitting Asian 
economies in 1997. This financial volatility and instability is the “downside of the 
free capital mobility”6 that has to be considered seriously by any policymaker. 
Therefore, the rationale behind the Tobin tax is to ameliorate, if not eliminate, this 
instability caused by the short-term speculation in currency markets by levying 
taxes on spot currency exchange transactions. 
 
2 Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) 
3 Devereux and Smith (1994) 
4 Stiglitz(2000) 
5 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “The Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars” May/June 1998 
issue, Foreign Affairs 
6 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, “---, the downside of the free capital mobility arises.” In the“The Capital Myth: 
The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars” May/June 1998 issue, Foreign Affairs 
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Recent research provides evidence of association between the cross-border 
capital transactions and income and consumption volatility, especially for 
developing and underdeveloped countries. By decomposing the effects of financial 
liberalization, Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008) find that liberalizing 
cross-border transactions increases the possibility of financial crises and in turn 
leads to growth loss. Schmukler (2004) also pointed out that the benefits from the 
risk diversification might not be as much as investors' expectation due to the 
potential high correlations among global markets after financial integration. 
Furthermore, from the policymakers' perspective, allowing free capital flows across 
borders inhibits difficulties in regulating and supervising the domestic financial 
system.
7
 
Indeed, for the past few decades, there are countries that did not show strong 
progress and suffered a series of financial crises even with liberalizing foreign 
capital transactions and domestic financial markets. For instance, Malaysia, a 
financial liberalized country, had experienced contracting economy since the 
advent of financial crisis in 1997. The negative private capital flows caused the 
collapse of the financial and foreign exchange markets, with its GDP growth 
declining from 7% pre-crisis level to a negative 6.7% at the height of the crisis in 
1998. Several other highly open Asian countries, such as Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Philippine, suffered similar fates during and after the crisis. 
Camdessus (1998) and Chow (2000) both attributed Asian financial crises in 
1997-98 to the twist of sequential order of financial liberalizations not the financial 
liberalization per se;
8
 From the case of Korea and Thailand where the disorderly 
capital account opening policies resulted from political pressure, Chow (2000) 
pointed out that economies will not be benefitted from international capital flows 
unless “ an optimum sequencing order” is observed (McKinnon 1973) and the 
financial system is well structured and supervised. Cole and Kehoe (1996)
9
 claims 
that it was self- fulfilling currency crisis triggered the 1994-95 Mexican financial 
crisis; similarly, this self-fulfilling mechanism in which international investors lose 
confidence in investing government bonds could as well explain the ongoing 
European sovereign debt crisis. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) not only 
find that capital account opening is associated with factor productivity which 
accounts for nearly two thirds of the economic growth but also prove that the 
financial openness does not induce financial crises. It is the high leverage of banks, 
not openness, to increase the risk of crisis.
10
 By confirming the dual effects of 
financial liberalization, Ranciere et al. (2008) confirm that the growth gains still 
outweigh the growth loss by nearly 1% of growth rate. 
Thus, many researchers started to cast doubts on the fast pace of financial 
openness with negative empirical results of the effects of financial openness on 
growth. In other words, the conventional wisdom that financial liberalization leads 
to output growth has been challenged. Therefore, policymakers mainly based one 
the two contrasting views of financial liberalization to determine if financial 
liberalization should be executed or the degree of the financial opening. 
Nonetheless, literature continues to deliver empirical evidence of the positive 
impact of financial liberalization on growth. Quinn (1997, 2008) claims that the 
change in financial regulation is positively associated with long-run economic 
 
7 Schumkler (2004) 
8 Chow and Gill (2000) (eds) “Weather the Storm”. Brookings Institution Press. In chapter eight, 
"What We Have Learned from the Asian Financial Crisis", of this book (p.218), Chow further argued 
that "financial liberalization is often undertaken without following a proper sequential order...Many 
economies opened financial markets without adequate time to build necessary supervisory structures." 
9 Cole, Harold L. and Timothy J. Kehoe (1996) 
10 Bekaert, G., C.R. Harvey, and C. Lundblad, (2011) 
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growth by employing capital account openness as an indicator of openness. 
Applying equity market liberalization dates as an alternative measure of openness, 
Bekaert, Henry, and Lundblad (2005) found that liberalizing domestic capital 
markets leads to 1% increase in annual real economic growth. Summers (2000) 
adds that the increased financial openness has proven to be one of essential policies 
for countries that seek to improve their national income level. 
Moreover, a growing number of empirical studies show no evidence on the 
effect of financial liberalization on economic growth. For example, by surveying 
fifty-seven countries from 1980-2000, Edison et.al (2002) do not reject the null 
hypothesis that financial openness has not effect on growth, even when 
comprehensive macroeconomic variables are controlled for in their model. 
Additionally, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, and Kose (2003) do not find a strong supportive 
association between financial liberalization and economic growth or consumption 
volatility.
11
 However, their paper shows that the impact of financial liberalization 
could be conducive to growth when combined with transparent government 
operations and good quality of human capital. That is, liberalizing financial market 
shows conditional impact on economy. 
Another branch of literature on the effect of financial liberalization focuses on 
the impact of financial market opening on capital allocation efficiency. Cho (1988) 
documents empirical evidence of the substantial improvement in capital allocation 
of credit as measured in the reduced variation of firms’ borrowing costs, after the 
Korean government started to implement various financial liberalizations since 
1980.  In addition, Abiad, Oomes, and Ueda (2008) showed robust evidence that 
financial liberalization promotes capital allocation efficiency due to reduced 
variation in expected returns to investment. In their research, a proxy for financial 
liberalization was used in place of the dispersion in Tobin’s Q across firms in five 
emerging economies.  Similarly, Umutlu, Akdeniz, and Salih (2009) study twenty-
five emerging countries and find the degree of financial liberalization inversely 
related to the total volatility of stock returns, even after controlling for firm size, 
liquidity, and crisis factors. 
 1.2 Stylized Facts across Seventeen Countries  
This study selects seventeen Asian countries as sample data and covers the time 
period from 1980 to 2010 to analyze how international financial liberalization, such 
as cross-border capital transactions, affects growth across selected Asian 
economies. These seventeen Asian countries include: advanced economies – Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan; developing economies - China, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand; and 
underdeveloped ones - Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam. Data is from the most 
recent three decades for two reasons: 1) most Asian economies launched financial 
liberalization policies in the beginning of 80s; 2) the dataset spanning for thirty 
years allows for the estimation of long-run growth trend. There are two reasons that 
these select seventeen Asian economies are a good sample for this study. 
First, these Asian economies have increasingly gained importance in world 
economy in 21st century. According to the World Bank, these seventeen Asian 
economies have contributed close to one fifth of the world GDP in 2011. Over the 
last decade, all these Asian economies continue to enjoy sustainable growth for the 
industrial ones, or expand rapidly for the emerging and underdeveloped ones, 
whereas western countries are either still suffering economic crises or trying to 
come out of recessions. In the Asia Pacific area, economic leaders such as Japan, 
Singapore, and South Korea, along with other emerging countries, such as China, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippine, Thailand, and Vietnam, all have 
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shown persistent economic growth for the last two decades even after suffering the 
financial crises of 1997 and 2008. In particular, growth in these Asian economies is 
projected to be ranging from 5% to more than 7% compared to 3% of the world for 
next decade, according to the prediction of the World Economic Outlook of IMF
12
. 
Thus, the economic development of these countries is of interest for economists. 
Secondly, following the trend of globalization beginning in 1980, Asian 
countries have been relaxing capital restrictions in order to promote growth. 
Economically advanced countries, including Japan and Singapore, have removed 
capital restrictions in the early 80s and maintained open trade policies since then. 
For emerging and underdeveloped countries in Asia, international financial 
integration has accelerated for the last ten years. In term of current account opening 
policies, these countries are eager to enter regional or global trade agreement and 
reduce or eliminate tariff or corporate taxes. For example, trade barriers have been 
gradually removed in China for the past decade. Strategically liberalizing the 
capital account to further attract foreign investments, Chinese government 
deregulated foreign capital investment for both inflows and outflows for the last 
few years. Foreign currency account restrictions are predicted to loosen soon. In 
mid-2005, renminbi (RMB) appreciated against US dollar by more than 15% 
following the new RMB exchange rate regime which allows market mechanism to 
come into play in affecting the exchange rate, while the Chinese government still 
holds main control over the price of RMB.
13
 Another restriction easing is the 
recently lifted ban on domestic securities in RMB invested by qualified foreign 
institutional investors (QFII). 
Moreover, India removed trade barriers for most of consumer products while 
still maintained restricted on certain service sectors to protect domestic industries. 
The same policies in terms of attracting import/export by singing free trade 
agreements, liberalizing the international capital ownership, and removing  foreign 
exchange control while stabilizing exchange rate, have been implemented in the 
rest of the emerging markets: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. 
Even for the underdeveloped countries, such as Lao, Vietnam, and Cambodia 
started attracting foreign direct investment in late 80s and early 90s. Liberalizing 
capital restrictions and opening financial market as well as facilitating inward 
investment have become a necessary tool to stimulate domestic economic 
development. To aid in domestic infrastructural development through an easing 
measure on capital inflows, India government raises the ceiling of government 
bond holding by nonresidents. The government of the Philippines also took a 
measure easing on capital inflow control by eliminating repatriation requirement 
for the divestment proceeds from foreign investments. To develop a financial 
system and encourage capital flows, Cambodia’s stock market commenced trading 
in 2001. Relaxing or abolishing on external borrowing is another easing measure 
implemented by officials. Once heavily controlled in the wake of 1997-1998 Asian 
crisis, the ban on the borrowing from nonresidents was lifted by Malaysian 
authorities in 2010. Similar measure appeared in India as well. 
Notwithstanding the capital opening policies have been employed by all these 
seventeen countries for the past thirty years, or even earlier for several economic 
advanced countries, not all of them have shown sustainable growth. (Chart 1.1-1.3 
show the relationships between growth and three financial openness indicators by 
country from 1981-2010.) These seventeen countries consist of high income 
economies, emerging economies, and the underdeveloped ones. The high income 
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countries, including Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, fall into the 
category of high income group based on their Gross National Income (GNI) per 
capita under the classification systems of World Bank. Any country with a GNI per 
capita of $12,746 or higher in 2013 will be classified into the group of high-income 
economies according to the up to date classification of the World Bank. The 
selected emerging economies here, including China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Philippines, are middle income countries with GNI per capita 
ranging from $1,045 to $12,746 based on the classification of the World Bank.  We 
also choose several low income countries (GNI per capita is less than $1,045) as 
our undeveloped countries - Cambodia, Lao, Myanmar, and Vietnam- as most of 
the low income countries are now eager to liberalize economically and financially 
for the long term economic development. It appears that the economy in Japan has 
slowed down and went into the so-called “lost decade” in the last decades while 
their openness policies have been adopted and continued ever since 1980’s. The 
emerging and underdeveloped ones have performed strong growth especially for 
the last ten years whereas the intensity of capital opening varies from countries to 
countries. According to KAOPEN (Capital Account Openness index) which is 
constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008) and ranges from the most restricted of -1.86 to 
the least of +2.44 and up, Japan and Singapore score 2.44 which indicates the least 
restricted, while China and India scored the -1.16 since 1993 to present. Indonesia 
scored high in 2.44 in 90’s then constrained capital transactions after 1997 
currency crisis thus scored down to 1.1 till now. The rest of countries scored from -
0.11 to -1.16 in the last ten years. More information about KAOPEN will be 
discussed in next section. 
1.2.2. Overview of the financial openness policy of the seventeen 
countries: 
This section briefly summarizes the characteristics of the sample countries; the 
main sources of information are International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
A) Advanced economies: 
Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong has one of the world’s highest sustainable growth since 1980. As 
one of the major international financial center, Hong Kong has been attracting 
global businesses for the free trade environment, no restrictions on capital 
investment, no exchange rate controls, and highly efficient financial markets for 
decades. According to the Index of Economic Freedom issued by the Heritage 
Foundation, Hong Kong has been ranked the top among 186 countries in the world. 
Japan: 
Japan has been maintaining current account liberalization policies since 60s by 
large exports and imports raw materials. In terms of capital account, Japan had held 
tight control over capital flows in 50s and 60s. Owing to deregulation in 70s, both 
foreign direct investment and portfolio investment that are two major capital flows 
had grown rapidly in 80s. In particular, Japan has experienced a steady growth in 
both capital inflows and outflows: starting in 1980, the foreign asset and liabilities 
in absolute terms accounted for 28% of GDP and then reached almost 100% of 
GDP in early 90s; by the end of 2010, the sum of the magnitude of capital inflows 
and outflows reached almost 200% of the GDP. 
South Korea:  
Starting in early 60s, South Korea - one of the fast growing economies, has 
been an export- oriented country and the domestic market has been gradually 
opened for imports with exception of agricultural products. At the same time, to 
spur growth from the war, South Korean government started to allow for foreign 
capital investment to supplement the low saving rate by enacting the Foreign 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), H. P. Wei, p.253-301. 
259 
Capital Inducement Act in 1960. However, this early inflow capital was only 
limited to select manufacture sectors. The active liberalization policy towards FDI 
has not been promoted until late 90s. After suffering from 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, in contrast to other countries that mainly held conservative openness policy, 
the government instead promoted active FDI policies to attract foreign investment 
by allowing for cross-border merges and acquisitions in 1997, lifting bans on 
foreign land ownerships in 1998, etc.  
In order to encourage foreign portfolio investment after the financial crisis, 
Korean government removed the cap that would otherwise limit the daily 
transactions by foreign investors in stock market. This capital liberalizing policy 
drove up the foreign share of equity market from 11.9% before the crisis in 2005 to 
30% after crisis from 1998 to 2000. 
Singapore: 
Singapore, the highly liberalized economy, benefits from free international trade 
and foreign direct investment. With trade liberalization policies promoted by 
government, Singapore's importing and exporting volume reached four times GDP 
from 2008 to 2011. 
With efficient infrastructure and sound financial system, Singapore has become 
the main destination of foreign direct investment portfolio investment. Thus 
Singapore benefited from the influx of international capital. The rapidly rising 
investment activities by their residents in neighbor countries such as China, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and India have driven up the investment outflows.  
Taiwan: 
An export-oriented economy, Taiwan has been maintaining open policies 
favorable towards international trade and foreign investments for the past few 
decades. Since Taiwan has experienced more than 5% annual GDP growth on 
average for the last three decades, most studies attributed Taiwan’s sustained 
growth to the effort of liberalization economically and financially. Due to the open 
policy in foreign direct investment and financial markets, the industries in Taiwan 
have grown and been competitive with the capital infusion and technology 
transferring.  
According to the statistics provided by UNCTAD (United Nation Conference 
on Trade and Development), Taiwan’s FDI has risen steadily from 35% of GDP in 
1980 to 60% of GDP in 2010. 
B) Developing countries: 
China: 
Since 1978, China has undertaken liberal policies to attract foreign capital for 
growth through permitting foreign direct investment in several cities along the 
coast. Since then, the government had expanded the liberalization through 
strengthening domestic infrastructure, institutionalizing the market-oriented 
economy, and relaxing the laws to attract multinational corporations. 
Ever since China accessed to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China has 
further been liberalizing their current and capital accounts to fully comply with the 
regulations under international opening policies under WTO. Not only has China 
become the leading trading nation by minimizing tariff and non-tariff trading 
barriers in goods and services across sectors substantially, but also China has 
become the major destination of global capital investments. The foreign direct 
investment has accounted for less than 1% during the 80s due to restricted 
regulations for protecting domestic industries from foreign ownerships. Through 
liberalizing the laws that govern the legal entities of foreign direct investments and 
opening up selective capital markets for portfolio investment, the amount of capital 
investment flowing into China from the rest of world has been drastically rising.  
The inflow funds from global markets have actively invested in China in the forms 
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of foreign direct investment across industries, portfolio equities and bonds, and 
other types of capital instruments. In terms of exchange rate regime, starting in 
mid-80s, China had conducted a controlled float exchange rate policy then in 90s, 
the Chinese exchange control regulations have been gradually relaxed by allowing 
foreign currency transactions through authorized banks for export and import 
trades. 
India:  
India had been a closed and inward-looking economy up until 1991. Under the 
economic reforms implemented by the new political regime in 1991, international 
trades were liberalized by reducing tariffs on imported goods, taxes on exported 
goods and quotas as well as deregulated foreign direct investment and portfolio 
investment. In 2005, India government substantially liberalized the foreign direct 
investment in many sectors by allowing non-residents to take a full ownership or 
raising the participations of foreign equity stakes across sectors. 
Indonesia: 
Indonesia has remained an open economic environment since late 1980 in both 
international trade and foreign investment. In 2012, foreign fund accounts for two 
thirds of the market capitalization. Overseas capital investments are strongly 
needed and officially welcomed. The major impediment that discourages the 
investment abroad is the ineffective law enforcement. 
FDI inflows slowed down after financial crisis. Soon after the crisis, in 1999, 
Indonesia was able to recover by government policies, including taking over 
nonperforming loans and restructuring debts. And since the outbreak of financial 
crisis, FDI approvals by the officials fell. 
Malaysia: 
As one of the founders of ASEAN Free Trade Area, Malaysia has been 
promoting international trades among members and continued to enter free trade 
agreements to integrate its economy into global market. 
Malaysian has long been one of the most favored investment destinations by 
foreign investors since 1986 when the government announced a series of measures 
to welcome foreign direct investments, such as tax exemptions and liberal rules. 
The rising trend of foreign investments in Malaysia discontinued due to 1997 
financial crisis. The foreign capital inflows had declined from 1998 to 2001.  
However, by adopting effective measures, including foreign exchange controls, 
local currency de-internationalization, and foreign ownership deregulation, in the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis from 1997 to 2000, Malaysia was able to 
regain the foreign investment confidence. The inflows of cross-board investments 
started to increase in 2002. 
Pakistan: 
In spite of the political instability and poor infrastructure, Pakistan has been 
rapidly growing since the beginning of the 21
st
 century. The rapid economic growth 
of this semi- industrialized country is due mainly due to the transformation from 
Agricultural to a manufacture and service economy and the liberalization on trades, 
FDI and portfolio investments.  
Both imports and exports in Pakistan have been increasing since 1980. In 2012, 
the FDI flows accounted for 12% of Pakistan’s GDP compared to 2% back in 
1980. Portfolio investments from foreign investors have risen as well for the past 
two decades thanks to the openness in financial market. 
The Philippines: 
After the long dictatorship of F. Marcos, the Philippines had undergone a series 
of economic reforms. Now the Philippines, a newly industrializing country, has 
showed steady growth over the past decade and became one of the major 
investment destinations.  
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With the rising of international trade volume since 1990 and currently both 
imports and exports accounting for 40% of GDP in 2012, the Philippines has 
remained liberalized foreign trade policies. 
Despite facing similar challenges, such as corruption, poor infrastructure, and 
bureaucracy, as its emerging counterparts to attract investments abroad, the 
Philippine government has been liberalizing long-term foreign investment for 
economic growth. 
FDI inflows declined beginning the third quarter of 1997 following the Asian 
financial crisis. 
Sri Lanka: 
Sri Lanka has experienced highly economic growth especially for the last 
decade. Expected to be higher than 10% in next ten years, annual GDP of Sri 
Lanka grew from 5% in 2000 to more than 7% in 2010 with a temporary decline in 
2009 due to the financial crisis.
14
  
The growing volume of imports and exports as well as FDI contribute to Sri 
Lanka’s economic success.  
Thailand: 
Thailand has been one of export-led economies as most neighbors in Asia. From 
2003 to 2010, Thailand has continued to welcome international trades by 
negotiating free trade agreements for selected products with various countries, 
including China, India, Australia, Japan, and United States.  
Even though attracting foreign investment is one of the reforms leading to 
growth, Thai government imposed restrictions on capital account transactions by 
passing the 1999 Foreign Business Act. In this Act, 49% of foreign ownerships of 
equity are capped for many sectors, such as media, agriculture, and construction. In 
addition, political and macroeconomic instabilities, corruptions, and inefficient 
institutions discourage foreign capital investments. 
Surprisingly, the inflows of FDI to Thailand had been stable ever since the 1997 
financial crisis. 
C) Underdeveloped ones: 
Cambodia:  
It is not until 1989 that Cambodia implemented open market system and 
embraced international integration. The major capital resource is from foreign aid 
throughout 90s and started to attract investment overseas after adopting an 
economic reform in 2006 to improve the infrastructure and corruption conditions. 
According to IMF, both imports and exports of Cambodia have been rising 
since late 1980. Foreign direct investment net inflows continued to rise from 1.37% 
of GDP in 1992 and reached more than 8% of GDP in 1996. The FDI started to fall 
from 1998 after Asian crisis broke through to 2003. Foreign investors regained the 
confidence and pushed the investment to the record high of 10% of GDP in 2007. 
In terms of portfolio investment in equities, due to the fact that the Cambodia 
securities exchange-CSX was not established until 2010 and only one listed 
company is traded, the channel of foreign financing is very limited. 
Laos:  
As one of the poorest countries in Asia, Laos has relied heavily on foreign aid 
and loans as capital resources required for growth. Not until 1989, Lao government 
lifted trade barriers, promoted foreign investment and maintained a market 
exchange rate. The financial development has progressed slowly and the domestic 
stock market was inaugurated in 2011 and so far in 2013 only two company stocks 
are listed. 
Myanmar: 
 
14 “Sri Lanka”. International Monetary Fund, July 2014. 
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Myanmar, once the largest exporter of rice, have suffered the macroeconomic 
and political instability ever since its independence in 1948.  
Even though the liberalization of foreign investment in 1989, the country would 
not induce much of investment overseas due to the insufficient infrastructure, poor 
managed institutions and corruption. In addition, in 2003 US and European Union 
imposed sanctions and embargos against Myanmar that further deteriorated the 
international trades. 
The financial system of Myanmar is under developed: the Myanmar securities 
exchange was formed in 1996 but only two firms are listed as of 2012; major bank 
crisis in 2005 brought down investment climate. 
Vietnam:  
Vietnam started to integrate into the global market economically and financially 
mainly after the dissolution of the Comecon in 1991. Ever since then, Vietnam has 
been liberalizing their current account through an open trading policy and foreign 
direct investment has been encouraged. Although the short history of their stock 
market established in 2000, international capital investment has been encouraged 
by reduced foreign equity ownership limit and full ownership for international 
bond investors since 2003. The exchange rate is under market - oriented "crawling 
peg". 
Following the 1997 Asian Financial crisis, Vietnam had one time encountered 
contracted economy for three years by limiting foreign trade. Overall, throughout 
the past three decades, Vietnam has been mainly maintaining openness policies to 
attract foreign capital to support domestic economic development. 
1.3 Statement of problem  
The main contributions of this study are the following: 
1) The purpose of this study is to investigate the financial openness effect on 
economic growth in Asian economies. Most of the literature surveys the sample 
countries across continents but few provide the effect of financial openness on 
growth for Asian countries. The growth effect of financial openness will be tested 
across countries and income groups. 
2)   Both de jure and de facto measurements of financial liberalization are 
employed in this study. Unlike most of empirical literature considering the coarse 
index AREAER (Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions) of the IMF, this study uses a new indicator, KAOPEN, as the de jure 
proxy of financial openness measure. KAOPEN index is finer and more accurate 
compared to the IMF’s index, as KAOPEN contains more information by including 
four opening categories rather than IMF’s binary indicator.  As for de facto proxy, 
this study considers the quantitative capital activities as the de facto proxy. In 
particular, two major capital activities are employed as the measurements in our 
analysis for testing growth effects of financial liberalization: foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and portfolio investment flows. This study is an attempt to 
improve the assessment by separating capital inflows from outflows in empirical 
examination. Therefore, this study ultimately uses four de facto proxies of financial 
liberalization: inward FDI, outward FDI, Portfolio Investment in assets, and 
Portfolio Investment in liabilities.  
3) In terms of econometrics techniques, two panel estimation procedures are 
conducted for: least square with country and time dummy variables and system 
GMM. One advantage of conducting system GMM instead of difference GMM is 
that time invariant or country specific variable can be incorporated in system 
GMM. While most earlier studies provided results with cross-sectional estimations 
that inhibited biases, this study utilizes panel estimators with country-specific 
effects seek to deliver more efficient results. 
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4) The last three decades of dataset are included in the analysis, from 1980 to 
2010. 
5) This study investigates the growth effect of financial openness as well as 
the interactive effects of financial openness.  
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II discusses financial 
liberalization indicators employed in literature. Prior studies on the relationship 
between the financial liberalization and economic growth are reviewed in the 
second part of this section. Section III introduces the model, data, summary 
statistics, and various econometric methodologies implemented. Section IV 
analyzes empirical results. Finally, Section V concludes and with policy 
implications based on empirical results. 
 
2.  Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth  
2.1 Financial Liberalization Indicators 
The broad definition of financial liberalization refers to free cross-boundary 
capital flows resulted from less capital restrictions imposed by government and 
more free market role in capital market. Ever since the debate over the impact of 
financial liberalization on growth started, many research studies have presented 
different findings. One of the main reasons that complicates empirical analysis and 
has caused the mixed results across studies is the variety of the measurements of 
financial openness proxied in the literature. Therefore, in this section provides a 
comparison on characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of a range of different 
financial openness indicators employed in current studies.   
At present, more than ten different types of financial openness indicators have 
been used as proxies of financial liberalization.  There are mainly two types of 
measures of financial openness employed in the literature: de jure and de facto 
measures. The former, determined by policy makers, reflects the degree of a 
country’s restrictions on capital market integration, international financial 
investment, and foreign exchange rate regime; the latter captures the actual capital 
account flows across border. 
15
 Supposedly, the de facto measure should reflect the 
de jure restriction imposed by officials, but for certain economies, this is not the 
case. There are four scenarios showing how these two measures are related: 
countries with openness policies experiencing high volume of capital flows, as 
industrialized countries; countries with openness policies but still facing low 
volume of capital flows, as certain less developed countries with undeveloped 
infrastructure; countries with highly regulated and thus restricted policies but still 
attracting large financial flows, as emerging economies; and countries with fully 
closed policies resulted in low flows of capital. Thus, it is essential to consider 
these two types of measures in the analysis to test for the robustness of the effect of 
financial liberalization on growth. 
De jure indicators employed in most of the early literature differ somewhat but 
are all developed based on IMF’s record of capital account restriction for countries. 
Starting in 1966, the IMF issues an annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Drawing on information provided by member 
countries and observed by IMF’s staff, this IMF’s restriction report reflects capital 
account information in the following categories: capital account openness, current 
account openness, surrender requirements on the proceeds of export, and exchange 
rate practices. Earlier international finance literature directly used IMF’s report as 
their openness measurement or generates their own de jure indicators with the 
information mainly from the category of capital account openness for their studies. 
 
15 Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, (2006). “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal” International 
Monetary Fund, 2006  
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All these categories are reported in the form of binary variables. These binary 
indicators show either 0 when a country is always restricted or 1 when never 
restricted. Updated annually, this IMF report provides restriction information of 
member countries in terms of exchange rates and trade practices and capital 
control. This report, namely AREAER, spans 188 countries and is considered the 
largest sample coverage available. 
Several challenges should be highlighted for considering the data source 
derived from this apparently comprehensive AREAER report. First, this binary 
indicator assigned based on IMF’s judgment does not provide the level of a 
country’s capital account openness. Second, as long as one restriction imposed, this 
country scores 0 regardless other openness policies might be in place. Third, the 
detailed composition of the openness which could be sensitive to analysis cannot 
be found in this on/off indicator. For example, according to IMF’s record, a 
country that is open to foreign investment but prohibits residents to invest abroad 
scores the same as a country that imposes restrictions on foreign investment but no 
restrictions on their residents’ investment abroad. Fourth, there are two different 
dataset formats for AREAER. To improve the coarseness of earlier version (before 
1996) discredited by literature, starting in 1996, IMF has extended the old version 
by including thirteen subcategories in the report to provide additional information 
on capital control. Although this modification provides more detail information, a 
data inconsistency arises. Therefore, the dataset presents inconsistent formats: four 
main categories up to the 1997 publication for the record of 1996, but these four 
coarse categories had been disaggregated into thirteen categories after 1997 data 
sets. Thus, there was a disruption in the series and the dataset before 1997 and after 
1997 are inconsistent. Therefore, for the contemporary research including our study 
that often requires dataset for multiple decades finds this IMF indicator 
inappropriate for empirical analysis.  
Although IMF’s annual report does not provide intensity and features of capital 
account openness (or restriction), the number of years in which a country has 
opened capital markets is recorded in IMF’s AREAER report. Therefore, studies 
such as Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), Rodrik (1998) and Klein and Olivei 
(1999) generate a variable ranging from 0 to one as an alternative indicator by 
calculating the proportion of years that a country has opened capital markets during 
certain period. For example, based on the IMF’s record, Japan had open markets 
for eight years during the period of 1976-1985 and thus Japan score 0.8 in this 
index. The advantage of this “proportion” index is that it reflects the degree of the 
openness rather than the binary index. However, the shortfall of this index is that 
the duration of the openness is not necessary consistent with the timing of the 
undertaking the openness policy. For instance, in case of Japan, IMF’s record does 
not show the exact year in which Japan had opened up their capital markets. It 
might be the case that Japan’s capital markets had been opened for the first eight 
years (from 1976-1985) out of this ten-year period then closed for the last two 
years (1985-86). Or Japan had closed capital markets for the first two years then 
opened till the end of the period. Another possible scenario is that Japan had not 
continuously liberalized or restricted their capital markets over the ten-year period. 
In order to capture the intensity of capital transaction controls other than the 
“proportion” index described earlier, Quinn (1997) develops coding rules by 
assigning scores ranging from 0-4 associated with the intensity of capital controls 
based on the capital and current account restrictions reported in AREAER. Rather 
than IMF’s on/off indicator, Quinn’s measure quantifies a nation’s capital 
restrictions by ranking the control instruments. For instance, 0 will be assigned for 
the country that capital account transactions are completely restricted, 0.5 will be 
assigned if some regulations are imposed, and 1 will be assigned when heavy taxes 
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are levied on capital transactions. In general, Quinn’s indicator outperformed 
IMF’s coarse one for two reasons: first, Quinn (1997) was the first to classify 
capital flows into inflows and outflows; second, Quinn’s measure quantifies the 
level of de-jure controls a country imposes. These assigned values are financial 
indicators and they are available annually since 1950, covering 64 countries 
(OECD and non-OECD). However, this subjective measure draws some criticism 
since it may not capture the direction of capital flow restrictions and the types of 
transactions targeted. 
KAOPEN is another de jure financial liberalization measure, constructed by two 
economists, Chinn and Ito, and is the most frequently used by current studies. In 
order to better measure the intensity of cross border financial openness, Chinn and 
Ito (2008) constructed an index based on the four assigned binary indicators (the 
presence or absence of multiple exchange rates, current account restrictions, capital 
account restrictions, and the repatriation and surrender of trading proceeds) from 
the tables in the IMF’s AREAER by reversing the value of IMF binary variables 
which originally indicate more controls when the value is higher. Instead, 1 will be 
assigned when restrictions are lifted (open) and 0 when restrictions imposed (close) 
under each category in constructing KAOPEN. For the variable of capital account 
restrictions, the value takes on the average of shares of a five-year window that 
capital restrictions were not in effect. By conducting standardized principal 
component analysis, the value of the first principal component is KAOPEN index. 
The important advantage of this de jure alternative is first the comprehensive 
openness information obtained by incorporating four main financial liberalization 
policies related to the capital flows instead of focusing solely on capital account 
transactions as in Quinn (1997). Second, KAOPEN not only captures 
comprehensive restrictions but also inflow and outflow transactions of a country. 
Third, Chinn and Ito (2008) find the correlation between KAOPEN and IMF 
AREAER is more than 80%. Another advantage of this publicly available index is 
that it is frequently updated and currently encompasses 182 countries for the period 
of 1970-2011. Nevertheless, critics have raised the concerns on this index. First, 
the information required to construct KAOPEN is based on AREAER and the 
criteria of opening policies has never been clearly defined in AREAER.
16
 In 
addition, the five year average of the capital account openness could not show the 
change of policies in a given year and the country needs to wait five years to be 
assigned 1 in this subcategory even with a fully opening policy executed that could 
arise measurement error issue. This index has a mean of zero and it ranges from 
minimum value of -1.86 to maximum value of 2.44 for all 182 countries surveyed 
between 1970 and 2011. 
A growing number of studies such as Bekaert et al. (2005) and Chari and Henry 
(2004) have considered stock market openness as a proxy for financial 
liberalization instead of conventional capital account openness. The indicator is 
based on the official date of equity market liberalization. The binary variable takes 
on the value one when foreign investors are able to own domestic equities and zero 
otherwise.  
From the policymakers’ perspective, de jure measures might be more relevant 
since the authorities have control over policy implementation. Nevertheless, de 
facto measures are gaining importance in the literature as the de facto measures 
focus on quantitative measurement of financial openness as opposed to the 
qualitative de jure measurements, and thus may better capture the actual effects and 
the intensity of liberalization. These de facto measures are especially important 
when the focus is on countries with lax regulations.  
 
16 See the discussion in the paper by Karcher and Steinberg (2013) 
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Most of these outcome-based measures involve capital account inflows as well 
as outflows. For example, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) proxy financial 
liberalization by aggregating a nation’s gross foreign direct investment and 
portfolio of asset and liabilities. It is done via the accumulated inflows and 
outflows of foreign capital in sample countries as a share of GDP. This stock of 
capital flows indicates the diversifying opportunities of nonresidents’ investment in 
a country and residents’ outward foreign investments. This most widely used de 
facto indicator covers 145 countries during the period of 1970-2010. Recent studies 
decomposed the aggregation of capital flows into FDI and foreign portfolio 
investment as the openness indicator variables due to the different nature of these 
types of investment tools. 
Another type of de facto measure, proposed by Bekaert (1995), indicates the 
level of the equity market openness by identifying the ratio of the availability of 
foreign holdings to the total domestic equity market capitalization. As an 
alternative to measure the market liberalization by assigning either 0 or 1 based on 
if the equity market is accessible to foreign investors, this continuous variable 
quantifies the degree of equity market openness with scale 0-1 where two extreme 
opposites refer to fully open to foreign investor (1) or closed . Much research is 
done now by incorporating both de jure and de facto measures to provide a more 
comprehensive examination. This approach is done so as to capture more 
dimensions of financial integration, e.g., Edison et al. (2002) proxy four indicators: 
the degree of capital account restriction from the IMF as a de jure indicator and 
three other de facto indicators involving stock of assets and liabilities. Although 
this strategy intends to clarify previous results on the effects of financial 
liberalization, it tends to overlap information and presents itself with inter-
correlation problems. Quinn and Toyoda (2008) point out that the variables that 
were assumed to be independent and were used in growth regressions turn out to be 
not independent but rather exhibit a strong correlation between them.  The 
advantage of de jure measures is that they reflect policy levers, and thus results 
based on them may have policy implications for reforms that a government might 
consider. Their disadvantage is that they may capture poorly the actual degree of 
financial integration, either because the true nature of legal restrictions is 
erroneously measured, or because these government impediments are imperfectly 
enforced. Nonetheless, from the volume of the literature, authors' place more 
weight on the de jure measures, since the de facto ones represent equilibrium 
outcomes, and may be more noisy reflections of policy.   
2.2 Literature Review 
There has been little consensus in empirical literature over the effects of 
opening financial flows on the economic growth. Different estimation results stem 
from various financial liberalization indicator, econometrics techniques, and data 
coverage. This section surveys various studies that are most cited on this topic and 
provides detailed review of the papers along different dimensions, including the 
financial openness indicators, model specifications, methodologies, and main 
results. As shown in Appendix A, the literature surveyed is classified into three 
groups based on different measures employed: the first group of the literature 
considers de jure measures as the proxy of financial liberalization, the second one 
employs de facto measures, and the third group employs both.  
The first group employing de jure measures in their studies include Quinn 
(1997), O’Donnell (2001), Klein and Oliveri (2008), and Baker (2005). These 
papers either employ IMF’s AREAER record for the financial liberalization 
measure or construct their own measure based on IMF’s record of capital 
restrictions imposed by countries as their de jure measures in the studies. Although 
de jure measures are commonly used in these empirical studies, ambiguous results 
Journal of Economics and Political Economy 
 JEPE, 1(2), H. P. Wei, p.253-301. 
267 
are still found. Quinn (1997) was the pioneer to create a financial liberalization 
index based on the IMF’s capital account control report. The Quinn index 
quantifies the capital account control (or openness) by subjectively assigning 
scores within 0-4 range of scale for each country based on the narrative description 
provided by IMF and thus this Quinn index is more informative relative to IMF’s 0 
or 1 record of capital account control. The advantage of this manually adjusted 
index is that it is able to capture the intensity of the financial openness rather than 
IMF’s on/off category. With data collected from 64 countries over the period from 
1958 to 1988, Quinn (1997) is able to present positive effect of capital account 
openness on economic growth, by employing cross sectional OLS growth 
regression with a number of control variables. Quinn’s result suggests that financial 
liberalization significantly improved growth. However, without the inclusion of 
trade openness in his regression, it raises concerns on the results due to the 
correlation between financial openness and trade openness.  
Other studies have shown that liberalization policy may affect countries 
differently. By using Share measure (years of liberalization as a share of the years 
considered), O’Donnell (2001) documents that there is a positive impact of 
liberalization on poor countries but a negative effect on rich countries. Klein and 
Olivei (2008) find similar results that financial liberalization has greatly impacted 
solely the middle-income countries but not the poorest and the richest countries. 
Employing the date  of equity market opening to foreign investors as a proxy for 
financial liberalization, Bekaert et al. (2005) implement a growth model that 
includes the ratio of trade to GDP as one of the control variables. Their study 
shows strong evidence that financial market opening leads to a 1% increase in 
annual GDP growth per capita. For comparison, two other de jure measures of 
capital account openness are used in Bekaert's (2005): IMF capital account 
openness and Quinn’s measures. Interestingly, the results show that the growth 
effect is not significant with IMF indicator, but there is a strong growth effect with 
Quinn’s measure.  
Recently, a growing research area is to study the indirect benefits of 
international financial liberalization on economies and indicated the 
microeconomic effect of liberalizing the financial sector on the return volatility for 
firm level. In particular, several papers claim that liberalization leads to a decline 
of capital return volatilities, which in turn benefits the macro condition of the 
country. Abiad et al. (2008) study whether financial openness improves efficiency 
of capital allocation, as measured by the dispersion of Tobin’s Q across firms from 
five countries: India, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. In this paper, two 
proxies of financial liberalization are considered: the ratio of bank credit to GDP 
and the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. By controlling for stock market 
liquidity proxied by trading volume and trade openness that measures imports and 
exports, their paper finds that the Tobin’s Q dispersions are greatly reduced and 
thus it implies that financial liberalization significantly improves efficiency in 
capital allocation. 
Prasad et al. (2003) find no robust evidence supporting the effect of financial 
openness on economic growth. The paper reports that consumption might fluctuate 
in some countries where one might interpret the liberalization policy as harmful to 
the economy. It is worth noting that their results also show that countries with 
better macroeconomic policies, including more stable political environment, more 
sound financial system, more stable and transparent government operation, better 
quality of human capital, and more sound financial system, tend to perform better 
in attracting foreign direct investment. The authors conclude that the benefit of 
financial openness can only be derived fully with preconditions of systematic 
stable macroeconomic frameworks. This finding is consistent with the result 
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documented in the paper by Rodrik (1999) that, in order to be benefitted from the 
financial openness, countries require good domestic governance with regulatory 
policies and supervisory agencies. 
 While most of the financial openness literature in the field of international 
economics investigates whether the liberalizing financial markets leads to growth 
or crisis, some researchers claim that trade openness also plays a determined role in 
promoting economy. Their claim is documented by the link between trade and 
financial openness. Aizenman (2009) analyzes the relationship between financial 
openness and trade openness. He proxies capital inflows and outflows as a 
financial openness measure, and exports and imports as the trade openness measure. 
The main finding in this paper is that greater trade liberalization will inevitably 
lead to financial openness. However, his analysis focuses solely on the impact of 
trade openness on financial openness and not the reverse feedbacks. 
Recently, many studies utilize both de jure and de facto measures to proxy 
financial liberalization in their research. Employing four different types of proxies 
for financial liberalization, and a variety of econometric approaches, Edison et al. 
(2002) find no support for the effect of financial openness on economic growth 
even when controlling for macroeconomic characteristics from data of fifty-seven 
countries over the period from 1980 to 2000. To assess the potential effects on 
certain countries, they add several interaction terms between financial openness 
indicator and several key macroeconomic conditions in the model specification. 
The study presents mixed results. First, they find no significant result of employing 
both types of liberalization proxies for either poor or rich countries. Second, by 
considering fiscal surplus as one measure of macro policies, they found that the 
interaction term does not enter significantly. Third, by using inflation as the other 
measure of policies, their results suggest that the effect of liberalization is inversely 
related to inflation. Furthermore, the result is not robust across four proxies. 
  
3. Model, Data, and Methodologies 
3.1 Growth Model and Data Description 
This dissertation is to answer the core questions whether financial opening 
affects economic growth among these seventeen Asian economies. By following 
the framework of Edison et al. (2002), we construct our growth model in which 
financial openness along with other growth determinants affects economic progress.  
We consider standardized growth model in our study: 
),( ititit XFOfY   
where   
itY : real per capita GDP growth rate  
itFO : one of the five measures of financial Openness indicators 
itX : a matrix of control variables  
The following remarks provide details about all variables employed in the 
model.  
(a) The dependent variable in the growth model 
Real per capita GDP growth rate represents the dependent variable that 
measures a country’s growth in the model. The growth rates collected from Penn 
World Table 7.1 are adjusted for the purchasing power parity. Table A.1 shows the 
rising trend of economic growth among these Asian economies over the last three 
decades. The second, third, and fourth columns in Table A.1 report average growth 
rate by country for each decade, respectively. The last row of Table A.1 shows that 
on average, all these Asian economies grow 3.87% in 1980s, 3.90% in 1990s, 4.72% 
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in 2000s) while the increases intensify during the last decade and mainly focus on 
the emerging and less developed economies.  
(b) The financial openness proxies 
In this study, financial openness refers to the extent to which a country’s cross-
border capital transactions that comprise not only capital inflows contributed by the 
global investors but also capital outflows stemming from the home investors’ 
global diversification portfolios. Two types of financial openness proxies are 
employed in the model: de jure and de facto.  
i) De jure proxy (officially announced restriction) 
This study uses KAOPEN index as the de jure financial opening measurement. 
As mentioned earlier, KAOPEN is constructed by Chinn and Ito (2006) and has 
been regularly updated as one advantage. The second advantage is that this index 
captures four categories of capital restrictions and provides more information 
compared to the coarse measure (1 or 0) based on the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). In particular, 
KAOPEN absorbs four categories of countries’ official opening tendency (current 
account, capital account, exchange rate regime, and the surrender requirement of 
export proceeds) according to the IMF’s record and constructs KAOPEN index 
which takes on values from -1.86 to +2.44 that indicates the higher the number, the 
less restricted. As Table A.3 indicated, advanced countries in our sample except 
Korea, such as Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore all score higher than 2 and 
considered more financially opened economies. While all four underdeveloped 
countries stay still financially closed and receive negative KAOPEN index, 
emerging markets show mixed scores (China, India, Philippines, and Thailand 
scores negative but Indonesia and Malaysia score positive). KAOPEN serves as a 
popular de jure proxy not only is the dataset available publicly but also highly 
correlated to the IMF indicator as well as it quantifies the intensity of capital 
controls.  
ii) De facto proxy (quantitative capital flows) 
Two types of capital activities are measured to detect the degree of a country’s 
financial openness: foreign directive investment (FDI) and portfolio investment.  
1. Defined by the IMF and UNCTAD, “FDI refers to a cross-border 
investment associated with a resident in one country having control or a significant 
degree of influence on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another 
economy”17. The controlling or investment entity could be a foreign direct investor 
or a parent enterprise. According to the UNCTAD, FDI includes not only the 
transactions between two entities but also all subsequent transactions between the 
two entities and among all immediate foreign subsidiaries and associates.
18
 The 
rationale of choosing FDI as a financial opening proxy is that it is considered the 
major external capital sources by foreign investors for domestic enterprises. FDI is 
measured by the foreign ownership of domestic businesses and mainly includes 
three components: the share of the capital, retained profits, and intra-company 
loans. We use the database from United Nation Conference on Trade and 
Development as our data source. In Table A.1, the columns of Inward FDI stock 
and Outward FDI stock report the average as percentage of GDP over the last three 
decades by country. 
 
17 The Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDID) by IMF defines Foreign Direct Investment:" 
direct investment arises when an investor resident in one economy makes an investment that gives 
control or a significant degree of influence over the management of an enterprise that is resident in 
another economy." 
18 From the note of the summary of Inward and Outward foreign direct investment stocks, UNCTAD 
2014 
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2. Another de facto financial openness indicator considered in this study is 
foreign portfolio investment. Similar to FDI, foreign portfolio investment provides 
another cross-border measurement for openness. Foreign portfolio investment 
includes the financial claims of equity and debt transactions and positions other 
than those included in direct investment or reserve assets.
19
 In contrast to FDI, 
foreign portfolio investment plays a less or no role in business decision making 
process. However, the amount of foreign portfolio investments has been rising due 
to the higher liquidity and flexibility relative to FDI investments for the past three 
decades. This study draws two more de-facto indicators - foreign portfolio assets 
and foreign portfolio liabilities- from the updated database of the External Wealth 
of Nations Mark II database from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). This dataset has 
been widely employed by many empirical studies and it contains data for the 
period 1970-2011 and for 188 countries. Since our study traces back to 1980 and 
IMF’s dataset only covers data for the last two decades, the LMF dataset provides 
good sources for capital flows data. 
3. Many empirical papers aggregated both capital inflows and outflows as the 
proxy. As described earlier, Lane et al. (2007), Edison et al. (2002), and Prasad et 
al. (2003) all employ bilateral capital account transactions by combining the 
amount of assets and liabilities without the breakdown. However, theoretically, 
inward capital and outward capital are considered to have different impact on 
growth. Moreover, while most empirical papers use combined FDI and portfolio 
investment flows as the proxy, this study sets to report the growth effect of these 
two main types of capital account transactions separately. Thus, to capture the 
effects of both incoming and outgoing capital funds on growth, we employ both 
inward and outward of FDI and Portfolio investment as our financial opening 
proxies, namely FDI inflows, FDI outflows, Portfolio Assets (Portfolio investment 
outflows), and Portfolio Liabilities (Portfolio investment inflows). These are all 
stock measures and divided by GDP. 
(c) The control variables 
There are six control variables in the growth model including the initial income, 
schooling, government expenses, domestic credit to private sectors, terms of trade, 
and trade openness. First, this study employs lag of log income per capita as our 
initial income regressor. Secondly, the schooling measures the secondary school 
enrollment ratio which is the ratio of total enrollment to the total population. 
Thirdly, since government plays an essential role in the economic growth, the 
government expenses as a share of GDP, is another variable to be controlled for in 
our growth model. Fourthly, domestic credit provided to private sectors by 
domestic financial institutions as a percentage of GDP is employed as well in the 
growth model. This study refers it to a country’s financial fundamental led to 
economic growth. Fifthly, another variable is controlled in this model is the terms 
of trade. A country’s terms of trade is defined as the ratio of the price of exports to 
the price of imports. To prompt economic growth, many countries export goods 
and services overseas to take advantages of the global market in order to promote 
growth. However, a country might not benefit from rising exports if terms of trade 
deteriorates. In other words, a significant decline of the terms of trade can impede 
economic growth by offsetting the gain from exporting
20
. The last variable 
included in our model is Trade Openness as the growth effect of trade opening has 
been emphasized by countries. This study measures a country’s trade openness by 
aggregating imports and exports. All datasets are collected from United Nation 
 
19 Chapter 6 function categories, IMF 
20 Bhagwati, (1998). 
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Conference on Trade and Development, World Bank World Development 
Indicators and Penn World Table 7.1.  
Table A.4 summarizes the correlation relationships among all the variables, 
including dependent variable, five FL measures, and control variables in the model. 
There are three major correlations of the variables worth noting. First, we 
summarize the correlations between control variables and financial liberalization 
measures. 1) Trade openness is positively and significantly correlated with 
KAOPEN, FDI inflows, FDI outflows, Portfolio assets, and Portfolio Liabilities. It 
reveals that countries with high trading volume tend to be more financially open. 2) 
Similarly, initial income is positively and significantly associated with all five FL 
measures. It implies that richer economies tend to ease the capital restrictions and 
have more international capital flows. 3) Countries with higher education 
attainment tend to deregulate capital restrictions as the schooling is positively and 
significantly correlated with KAOPEN. Countries with higher education level tend 
to be more open to foreign investors to invest in domestic portfolio equities and 
debt markets as the positive and significant correlation between schooling and 
portfolio liabilities. 4) Government expenses are negatively, significantly 
correlated with KAOPEN, FDI inflows, and Portfolio Liabilities. Countries with 
large volumes of expenditures in public sector tend to be more restricted in capital 
transactions and discourage foreign direct investments and portfolio investments. 5)  
Domestic credit is significantly and positively associated with all five FL measures. 
It signifies that the economies with easing credit markets tend to have greater level 
of financial openness.  6)  Again, corruption is significantly and positively 
correlated with all five FL indicators. It suggests that less corrupted countries (high 
score on corruption index) tend to be more financially open, as measured by de jure 
and de facto indicators. Second, among the measures of financial liberalization, 
KAOPEN is significantly and positively correlated with four other capital 
transactions. It shows that countries largely deregulated the capital restrictions have 
high volume of foreign direct investment and equity and debt portfolio transactions. 
Third, the correlations between economic growth rate and financial openness are . 
According to the first column of Table A.4, Growth is significantly and negatively 
correlated with KAOPEN but positively associated with FDI inflows.  
Due to the data limitation, our research focuses on the following seventeen 
Asian economies: China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Hong Kong, Lao, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. We collect annual data starting from 1980 to 2010. Table 
A.1 reports the growth trend of our sample countries. Table A.2 presents the 
summary statistics by country. Table A.3 describes all variables.  
3.2 Methodologies 
I perform Pooled OLS, panel procedures- random effects and fixed effects, 
dynamic panel system GMM, and two stage least squares as implemented in many 
prior studies to estimate whether the five liberalization proxies affect growth.  
First, our Pooled OLS framework is to conduct analysis by pooling our dataset 
pertaining 17 countries from 1980 to 2010 and is based on heteroskedasticity- 
robust standard errors. The baseline regression specification is as follows: 
 uXFLY  210        (1) 
Y  represents three years moving averaged real per capita GDP growth rate  
 FL represents one of the five measures of financial indicators 
 X  represents a matrix of control variables 
 u  the error term 
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Second, scholars acknowledge the drawback of inefficiency by pooling cross-
section and time-series data. Thus, we perform random effects analysis for our 
panel data in a generalized least squares (GLS) framework. By adding a time 
dummy variable, our specification of random effect is as follows: 
ittititit uDXFLY   210      (2) 
itY  is the dependent variable where i=1…17, and t=1…30  
itFL represents one of the five measures of financial indicators 
itX  represents a matrix of control variables 
tD  represents Time dummy variables 
itu  is the error term 
 
The composite error term )( itu  includes country specific unobservable term
)( ic and an idiosyncratic error term )( itv : itiit vcu 
21
. Under the random 
effects framework, we assume that  
,0)(  icE ,0)(  itv 0)(  itivc , 0)(  jiccE , 0)(  isitvvE , and 
2)var( cic  ,
2)var( vitv  . Third, we continue another panel procedure- fixed 
effects since there could be correlations between time invariant (country specific) 
components and control variables for our sample countries. We consider least 
square dummy variable (LSDV) structure with fixed effects for both countries and 
time periods for our fixed effect framework. Our LSDV model specification is as 
followed: 
ititititit uDDXFLY  10210    
itY  is the dependent variable where i=1…17, and t=1…30  
itFL  represents one of the five measures of financial indicators 
itX  represents a matrix of control variables 
tD  represents time dummy variables 
iD  represents country dummy variables 
itu  is the error term 
 
3.3 Hausman Test 
After running random and fixed effects regressions, a conventional test, 
Hausman test, is preformed to determine between random effect model and fixed 
effect model. The key difference between fixed and random effects is the 
orthogonality of the error terms. So, the null hypothesis of a Hausman test is that 
the error terms are uncorrelated with the regressors. Thus, fixed effects model will 
be more appropriate than random effects if the null hypothesis is rejected; 
otherwise, the random effects will be preferred if the test statistic is insignificant.  
The statistic of Hausman test is 
      2/1/ )var()var( xREFEREFEREFE 

   
 
21 Wooldridge J. M. (2002). 
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Based on our Hausman test result with a p vale of 0.02 which means that we are 
able to reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between error terms and 
regressors. Therefore, our fixed effects model produces more appropriate 
estimators than random effects model does and we report the estimation result for 
our fixed effects model.  
Fourth, for more consistent and efficient estimation, we implement dynamic 
system GMM panel approach proposed by Alrellano and Bond (1998). System 
GMM, unlike traditional one equation GMM, is consisted of two linear growth 
equations: one is in level and the other one is in differenced.  
The so called Dynamic panel system GMM proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) is the followings: 
ddifferenceXXYYYY
levelXYY
itititititititit
itiititit




)()()( 112211
211


 
where Y is real GDP per capital growth rate, X represents all explanatory 
variables including FL indicators,  is unobserved country specific factor, and u is 
the error term. 
Two types of instruments are employed in system GMM by considering both 
equations in levels and differences:  1) lagged levels as instruments for the 
equation in differences and 2) lagged differences as instruments for the equation in 
levels. The four moment conditions for system GMM are the followings: 
 
  0)(*)(
0)(*)(
,...,3,2,0)](*[
,...,3,2,0)](*[
21
21
1
1








itiitit
itiitit
ititsit
ititsit
XXE
YYE
TtsXE
TtsYE



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As noted in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1997), lagged 
levels are weak instruments as variables tend to be persistent in nature. By adding 
lagged differences as additional instruments, the system GMM estimator generated 
thus will be more consistent and efficient relative to traditional GMM. Lastly, 
Researchers often concern about simultaneous bias in the growth regression. In this 
section, as an alternative examination, the methodology of a panel two stage least 
squares instrumental variable estimator is implemented to control for this bias 
arising from the endogeneity that might plague our estimation . In particular, the 
most likely endogenous regressors identified in our model are trade openness and 
portfolio flows. The most challenging part for conducting two stage least squares is 
to identify an appropriate IV for endogenous regressors. Two conditions are 
required for a valid IV candidate: first, high correlations between IV and 
endogenous variables; second, IV should not be correlated with the error terms. 
Thus, I consider exchange rates of US and Europe as instruments for the variable 
of trade openness. Since US and European economies are the main import and 
export partners of these seventeen Asian economies, the exchange rates of US and 
Europe are deemed to be correlated with the variable of trade openness which 
aggregates the imports and exports and uncorrelated with the error term of the 
growth equation. Moreover, the real interest rate of US and Europe are employed 
as instruments for variables of portfolio assets and liabilities. In Asia, the majority 
of foreign portfolio investments are from US and Europe; and for the local 
residents of Asian countries, the capital markets of US and Europe are the most 
attracted financial markets for diversifying their investment portfolios. Thus, the 
real interest rates of US and Europe should be influential in portfolio flows into and 
out of Asian economies. 
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The dataset of the real effective exchange rate of US and Europe was collected 
from Bank International Settlement; and the source of the real interest rate of US 
and Europe is the World Development Index of World Bank. 
 
 4. Empirical results 
4.1 Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth 
We conduct an array of econometric analyses on the association between the 
financial opening and economic growth for all seventeen sample countries. We 
employ: i) pooled ordinary least square (OLS) ; ii) fixed effects model; iii) dynamic 
panel system GMM as implemented in many prior studies. There are six 
specifications estimated by each econometric method: we first estimate our growth 
model without financial liberalization variables. We then add our five proxies of 
financial liberalization one at a time along with other control variables in our 
growth model. After conducting Hausman test, we omit the estimation result from 
the random effect model, and report results of OLS, fixed effects, and system 
GMM. Table 1.1 - Table 1.3 present the estimation results by three methodologies, 
respectively. 
Table 1.1 reports estimation results by conducting pooled OLS method. Across 
six specifications, the coefficient of the de jure measure - KAOPEN is not 
statistically significant while three out of four de facto proxies show significant 
coefficients. Both Portfolio assets and liabilities show negative effect of financial 
liberalization on growth with significant level of 1% as indicated in column 5 and 
column 6. While FDI inflows do not show impacts on growth (no significance in 
column 3), FDI outflows have negative growth effects at 1% statistical significant 
level as in column 4 of Table 1.1. 
In Table 1.2, we use fixed effects method by assuming the country specific 
factor is correlated with control variables. Under this estimation, The de jure 
measure, KAOPEN is insignificant again in the regression (column 2 of Table 2) 
whereas all the de facto indicators have significant coefficients: while both the 
portfolio flows stay significant and negative coefficients; FDI inflow shows 
positive impact on growth (column 3 of Table 1.2) but FDI outflows affect growth 
negatively (column 4-6 of Table 1.2). 
Under the  fixed effects model, quantity based de facto measures including long 
term featured FDI and short term featured portfolio investments all affect growth. 
Despite a small intensity, inward FDI produces positive growth effects. 
By implementing the system GMM, Table 1.3 shows estimation results: once 
again, the de jure measure, KAOPEN, does not enter the regression significantly 
(column 2). None of the inward investment flows of the de facto indicators, FDI 
inflows and portfolio liabilities, show a significant coefficient (column 3 and 6 of 
Table 1.3). We interpret the results under GMM estimation in Table 1.3 as outward 
foreign investments regardless long term or short term impede growth significantly 
while inward foreign investments do not have growth effects. 
In Table 1.4, we report results of two stage least squares by using IVs for 
variables of Trade Openness and Portfolio assets/ liabilities. The estimation results 
revealed that all financial openness proxies but FDI outflows show statistical 
insignificance. FDI outflows enter the regression significantly negatively. This 
further confirms the results from POLS and fixed effects. The negative coefficient 
of FDI outflows indicates that a country 's growth will be slowed down if a country 
experiences large outward direct investments made by the residents. 
Three post-estimation standard tests are conducted: Over-identification test, 
Weakly identification test, and Hansen J test. 
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Overall we have same estimation result for the de jure measure and similar 
result for the other four de facto measures from our three estimation processes. 
However, we will summarize our results based on the fixed effect model (Table 2) 
due to the drawback of the OLS methodology and potential overstated standard 
errors by GMM. The policy related de jure measure, KAOPEN, seems to have no 
impact on economic growth and this result is consistent with most of the empirical 
studies. Moreover, both portfolio assets and liabilities (outflows and inflows) 
seems to have negative effects on growth. Capital is a crucial factor especially for 
countries in the process of economic development. If massive capital outflowing 
occurs, the economy will not only suffer from reduced local capital accumulations 
but also to certain extent deter capital inflow overseas. Other than FDI, two major 
financing instruments, equities and debt issuances are included in portfolio. 
Compared to FDI, portfolio investments tend to be more volatile in financial 
market due to the easiness of reversibility. 
In terms of FDI inflows, our results are consistent with economic predictions. 
Our result supports that FDI inflows boost economies. Theoretically, countries tend 
to gain from foreign direct investment through different forms of business 
expansions, such as new factories/machinery, merger and acquisition, joint 
ventures, etc. By these business expansions, countries open to FDI attain valuable 
skills and expertise, introduce updated technologies, help domestic job markets, 
and benefit local consumers by providing higher quality products due to more 
intense competition. 
Some other findings for control variable are worth noted: 1) Terms of Trade 
show negatively significant coefficients across all specifications at 5% significant 
level. This negative sign suggests that the improvement of terms of trade in a 
country could affect economic growth negatively through declining exports unless 
foreign demand for exports are inelastic. The exports of our sample countries 
except for industrialized ones are hardly price inelastic in the world market, thus 
any improved terms of trade would lead to the lowered exports which would 
subsequently impede the country's economic growth. 2) In line with the theory and 
the past studies, the positive coefficients of Trade openness variable suggest that 
more open on trades, countries benefit more; 3) however, Initial income, 
Schooling, and Government Expenses do not enter the regression significantly 
across all six specifications. 
4.2 Robustness check of the models 
As a robustness check of my models, China and Japan are omitted in a separate 
regression since the growth rates of these two countries are considered outliers 
because China’s growth rate is abnormally high while Japan’s growth rate remains 
extremely low especially for the past two decades.  
Table 2 compares the results for all five financial openness indexes among three 
different sub-sample countries after excluding the two outliers. 
After conducting fixed effects methodology, we report that KAOEPN does not 
significantly impact the growth when either China or Japan is excluded in the 
dataset. As for the effect of FDI inflows, sample countries still are able to benefit 
from the FDI inflows when China is excluded in the our list; whereas when Japan 
is excluded in the our sample countries, FDI inflows does not enter the regression 
significantly. FDI outflows and both Portfolio assets and liabilities remain 
significantly negative in the regressions with or without China or Japan in our 
sample. 
4.3 Interactive Effects- Financial Openness under other growth factors 
Recent papers report mixed results of interactive effects of financial openness 
on growth. Edison et.al (2002) reports no growth effects of the financial 
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liberalization under different economic and political environment.
22
 Prasad et al. 
(2003) and Borenstein et al. (1998) find that positive growth effects of FDI are 
shown in countries with high level of human capital. Boyd and Smith (1992) 
reports that only the countries with high level of law enforcement and sound 
financial market will have positive growth effects of international financial 
liberalization. Thus, in this section, we investigate where financial openness exerts 
any influence on GDP growth under varying macroeconomic environment by 
interacting financial measures with our control variables. 
By adding the interaction terms in the regression, we will investigate where the 
growth effects of financial liberalization depend on various social and economic 
conditions including trade openness, initial income, schooling, government 
expenses, domestic credit, and terms of trade. The specification with the interaction 
terms is the following:  
itititititit uXXFOFOY  3210 )*(   
Y : real per capita GDP growth rate  
FO : one of the five measures of financial openness indicators 
X : control variables  
Essentially, we are interested to assess if 
2  is positive with different x to 
assess if financial openness leads to growth only under certain situations, while we 
still report 
1 , 2 , and 3  in Table 3.1-3.6. 
In Table 3.1, All financial openness proxies and all interaction terms are 
significant (all β1's and β2's are statistically significant). The growth effects enter 
the regressions significantly positive when all the financial openness proxies 
interacted with Trade Openness. The results suggest that financial openness, 
whether it is measured by de jure or de facto indexes, can stimulate economic 
growth in countries with more opened trade markets.  
In Table 3.2, we examine if the relationship between growth and financial 
opening changes as the initial income varies. Three financial openness proxies and 
only two interactive terms enter the regressions significantly out of five regressions: 
KAOPEN*Initial Income and FDI Inflows*Initial income. The negative 
coefficients of the interactive terms indicate that financial openness (KAOPEN and 
FDI inflows) can promote growth for poorer countries or as countries become rich, 
the effect of opening financial market on growth become negative. This result 
contradicts with the theory that FDI contributes negatively to growth when initial 
level of income is low. Thus, financial openness has no growth effect under 
different income levels. 
We then interact schooling with financial openness proxies. The results from 
Table 3.3 show that two financial openness proxies have growth effects and only 
two out of five interactive terms, KAOPEN*Schooling and FDI Inflows*, have 
significant but negative coefficients. The results suggest that when proxied by 
KAOPEN and FDI inflows, financial openness have growth effects for countries 
with lower education level. Again, the sign of the interactive terms is contrary to 
theory.   
Table 3.4 shows the Financial openness-growth effect varies with government 
expenses. Out of five regressions, only one interactive term - 
KAOPEN*Government Expenses- enters the regression significantly but 
negatively. This suggests that easing financial restrictions (higher KAOPEN) can 
boost growth for countries with minimum government spending or easing financial 
restrictions might actually impede growth as countries spend more in public sectors. 
 
22 Edison et.al (2002). 
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Table 3.5 reports the estimation results of interactive terms of financial 
openness with domestic credit. Out of five interaction effects added regressions, 
only the one with FDI inflows enters significantly. It is concluded that the 
relationship between financial openness and growth does not vary with the 
domestic credit market condition. 
The last economic condition we examine is Terms of Trade. From Table 3.6, we 
report that four interactive terms have significantly positive coefficients. This 
suggests that when the economies with higher terms of trade, frequent cross-border 
direct investments, opening financial markets or deregulated financial policies can 
exert positive effects on economic growth. 
From Table 3.1-3.6, we have mixed results for the view that the growth effect of 
the financial openness varies with social and economic conditions. In summary, the 
growth effects of financial liberalization vary only with trade market openness and 
terms of trade. Financial openness will contribute to growth positively when the 
level of trade openness is high.  In addition, with the improvement of terms of trade, 
financial openness can exert positive effects on economic growth. Nevertheless, no 
growth effects of financial openness have been found even when other economic 
conditions (initial income level, schooling, government spending, and domestic 
credit) are varied. 
 
5. Conclusion & Policy Implications 
5.1 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This paper uses dynamic macroeconomic panel data to explore the long-run 
effects of financial liberalization on economic growth for seventeen Asian 
economies during the 1980-2010 periods. 
The main contributions of this research are:  
. While the existing literature spans sample countries across several 
continents, we specifically focus our sample region on Asian economies due to 
the abrupt growth and the increasing reliance on the international financial 
integration of this region. 
. We employ new financial liberalization indicators as proxies to predict the 
growth effects of financial liberalization - while most of current literature 
consider coarse measures, such as capital flows, my paper instead uses the 
components of capital flows, such as FDI and portfolio investment, as our main 
de facto measures and to improve upon the existing de facto financial 
liberalization measures, we further consider not only the components but also 
directions of capital flows in our study to investigate the impact of the inflows 
and outflows on growth respectively. As far as de jure measure, by employing 
KAOPEN, we are able to capture all aspects of officially announced financial 
openness policies. 
 . We examine the growth impact of financial liberalization by employing 
econometric methods appropriate for dynamic panel data in our research. 
By focusing on Asian region, using most updated panel data, and employing 
comprehensive econometric techniques, our study examines whether financial 
openness boosts economy and assesses interactive effects on economies through 
the gain from the capital flows under certain institutional development, including 
initial income level, education attainment, government expenses, domestic credit 
availability, trade openness and terms of trade.  The study uses both de jure and de 
facto measures as the financial openness indicators, and the main findings are as 
follows: 
i) Robust estimation results support the correlation between financial 
openness and GDP growth even when controlling for economic foundations. 
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Albeit the small intensity of the growth impact brought by financial openness to 
Asian economies, the results indicate that all four de facto measures - FDI 
inflows and outflows as well as portfolio assets and liabilities - affect GDP 
growth. 
ii) Directions of capital flows matters. Our estimation results indicate that 
FDI inflows has positive growth effects while FDI outflows, and portfolio 
investments all impose negative growth effects. Foreign portfolio investment 
does not contribute to economic growth, plausibly due to the speculative nature 
and volatilities. 
iii) Mixed results that support the idea that the growth effects of financial 
liberalization vary with macroeconomic fundamentals. Specifically, the 
financial openness exerts positive contributions to economic growth with higher 
level of trade openness (more imports and exports) and improved terms of trade 
not just the growth of export. However, we do not find growth effects of 
financial openness increases under other economic or financial environment. 
5.2. Recommendations for Further Study 
To identify aspects of financial openness affecting growth is not a simple task. 
One of the difficulties that complicates and plagues the past literature on this 
subject has been the effectiveness of the selected indicators associated with 
financial liberalization. Although we consider different dimensions of capital flows 
as our indicators, in essence, capital flows consist of funds transacted in many 
industries, and thus, it may be an interesting extension of this study to analyze the 
growth effects of financial liberalization across industries. 
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Tables 
TABLEA 1. The averaged growth rate over each decade by countries 
COUNTRY 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2010 
Cambodia 2.25 2.82 6.33 
China 7.93 8.85 9.65 
Hong Kong 5.83 1.98 4.02 
India 3.66 3.71 5.79 
Indonesia 4.18 3.18 3.74 
Japan 3.77 1.17 0.79 
Korea 7.09 5.91 4.05 
Lao 3.85 3.64 5.22 
Malaysia 2.95 4.53 3.03 
Myanmar -0.20 4.60 11.38 
Pakistan 3.13 1.26 2.27 
Philippines -0.70 0.42 2.80 
Singapore 5.52 4.54 3.35 
Sri Lanka 2.72 4.34 4.30 
Taiwan 6.24 5.47 3.52 
Thailand 5.29 4.32 3.86 
Vietnam 2.36 5.60 6.19 
    
All countries 3.87 3.90 4.72 
Note: The numbers reported in Table A.1 for countries are the averages of data from 1980-
2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2.Summary 
 Growth 
Terms of 
Trade 
Trade 
Openness 
Initial 
Income Schooling 
Gov. 
Expense  
Domestic 
Credit 
KAOPE
N 
Inward 
FDI stock 
Outward 
FDI stock 
Portfolio  
Assets 
Portfolio 
Liabilities 
Cambodia 3.89 96.21 10.07 183.47 27.80 6.06 6.06 -0.22 22.04 2.76 2.08 0.13 
China 8.84 97.97 37.06 222.78 50.10 17.31 92.95 -1.32 8.67 1.88 1.65 2.35 
Hong Kong 3.95 99.66 280.22 10344.02 75.16 8.09 149.27 2.46 349.78 148.31 129.69 48.64 
India 4.43 99.02 25.21 284.37 45.50 12.62 29.00 -1.17 3.21 0.97 0.10 6.42 
Indonesia 3.70 113.52 51.71 545.17 52.82 8.86 30.75 1.78 10.50 1.17 0.45 6.20 
Japan 1.87 94.39 23.28 21120.24 98.64 6.08 181.23 2.35 1.19 6.49 25.64 17.37 
Korea 5.63 110.40 70.57 3804.09 94.38 6.02 66.65 -0.40 5.86 3.42 2.58 13.11 
Lao 4.27 101.90 56.90 187.89 30.92 17.22 8.44 -1.36 15.81 0.49 0.00 0.17 
Malaysia 3.49 95.98 154.68 2339.92 59.63 5.50 103.71 1.10 30.74 10.23 3.08 26.09 
Myanmar 5.45 238.53 37.18 83.60 31.42 11.86 6.55 -1.51 19.97 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Pakistan 2.22 104.94 34.64 430.00 18.40 11.33 25.08 0.16 6.51 0.52 0.13 1.65 
Philippines 0.90 84.62 70.71 1108.57 73.63 4.99 30.02 -0.38 9.97 1.28 2.24 10.45 
Singapore 4.43 106.08 358.27 9793.31 83.76 9.34 90.63 2.35 116.02 58.97 104.75 30.27 
Sri Lanka 3.81 90.55 70.40 528.00 78.76 11.02 23.53 0.37 9.53 0.33 0.00 0.58 
Taiwan 2.95 91.38 101.21 4400.56 89.83 14.63 NA NA 7.84 23.84 20.37 13.37 
Thailand 4.47 112.88 90.16 920.19 48.59 6.70 95.85 -0.22 17.62 1.89 1.21 12.41 
Vietnam 4.77 99.04 109.91 198.22 44.87 11.40 51.03 -1.32 25.11 0.00 0.00 0.89 
Mean 4.34 108.06 104.78 3702.43 54.27 9.78 70.31 0.18 42.95 17.62 17.56 12.53 
Std. Dev. 4.13 57.36 99.58 5694.02 28.82 4.29 55.08 1.60 97.43 59.36 55.83 23.32 
Min -14.38 57.63 11.66 83.60 1.54 2.79 0.96 -1.86 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Max 17.99 721.07 445.62 21120.24 104.45 22.85 227.75 2.46 616.82 535.02 406.42 225.71 
TABLE A.3. Variables in dataset 
Variable  Description Units Source 
Growth Real GDP per capita annual growth 
rate 
% ppy + UNCTAD* 
Initial Income Logarithm of Real per capital GDP in 
1980 
Log (US $) UNCTAD* 
Schooling Secondary school enrollment as a share 
of total population 
% ppy WB/WBI ^ 
Gov. Expense  General government final consumption 
expenditure/GDP 
% ppy  UNCTAD* 
Domestic credit Domestic credit to private sectors/GDP % ppy  WB/WBI 
Terms of 
Trade 
The ratio of the export unit value index 
to the import unit value index 
% ppy  UNCTAD* 
Trade 
Openness 
Trade Openness measure: (Imports + 
Exports)/GDP 
% ppy UNCTAD* 
KAOPEN An index measuring a country's degree 
of capital account openness 
[-1.86-
2.44] 
Chinn and Ito 
(2006) 
FDI Inflows Inward foreign direct investment 
stock/GDP 
% ppy UNCTAD 
FDI Outflows Outward foreign direct investment 
stock/GDP 
% ppy UNCTAD 
Portfolio  
Assets 
Portfolio Assets/GDP % ppy UNCTAD 
Portfolio 
Liabilities 
Portfolio Liabilities/GDP % ppy UNCTAD 
% ppy+ - Percentage points per year 
* - UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
^ - WB/WBI - World Band and World Bank Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A.4. Correlation Matrix  
 Growth KAOPEN Inward   
FDI 
stock 
Outward              
FDI stock 
Portfolio    
Assets 
Portfolio   
Liabilities 
Terms 
of   
Trade 
Trade   
Openness 
Initial 
Income 
Schooling Gov. 
Expense  
Domestic 
Credit 
Growth 1            
KAOPEN -0.100* 1           
Inward                 
FDI stock 
0.037 0.456* 1          
Outward              
FDI stock 
-0.042 0.360* 0.641* 1         
Portfolio        
Assets 
-0.047 0.413* 0.597* 0.882* 1        
Portfolio   
Liabilities 
-0.053 0.442* 0.536* 0.869* 0.854* 1       
Terms of         
Trade 
-0.028 -0.109* -0.065 -0.059 -0.079 -0.119* 1      
Trade       
Openness 
0.039 0.570* 0.653* 0.622* 0.664* 0.603* -0.109* 1     
Initial            
Income 
-0.122* 0.692* 0.325* 0.295* 0.375* 0.358* -0.097* 0.337* 1    
Schooling -0.014 0.530* 0.184* 0.239* 0.293* 0.389* -0.234* 0.372* 0.608* 1   
Gov. 
Expense  
0.231* -0.404* -0.126* -0.031 -0.045 -0.208* 0.069 -0.180* -0.302* -0.254* 1  
Domestic 
Credit 
-0.032 0.602* 0.333* 0.336* 0.349* 0.471* -0.176* 0.396* 0.752* 0.657* -0.227* 1 
 
 
 
TABLE 1.1: Dependent Variable: Real GDP per capita growth, estimated by 
Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS)  
 POLS1 POLS2 POLS3 POLS4 POLS5 POLS6 
KAOPEN  0.5065     
  (0.2890)     
FDI Inflows   0.004    
   (0.0040)    
FDI Outflows    -0.0181***   
    (0.0050)   
Portfolio 
Assets 
    -0.0167***  
     (0.0050)  
Portfolio 
Liabilities 
     -0.0303** 
      (0.0120) 
Terms of 
Trade 
-0.0085*** -0.0089*** -0.0082*** -0.0079*** -0.0084*** -0.0081*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.0219*** 0.0210*** 0.0208*** 0.0382*** 0.0353*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0080) 
Initial 
Income 
0.0964 -0.017 0.0382 0.4151 0.6513 0.5745 
 (0.9720) (0.9800) (0.9750) (0.9660) (0.9790) (0.9830) 
Schooling 0.0305 0.0328 0.031 0.0123 0.0075 0.0201 
 (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) 
Government 
Expense 
-0.0491 -0.0745 -0.0441 0.008 -0.0128 -0.0474 
 (0.0990) (0.0980) (0.0990) (0.0970) (0.0980) (0.0980) 
Domestic 
Credit 
-0.0487*** -0.0495*** -0.0477*** -0.0547*** -0.0542*** -0.0523*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0130) 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.2543 0.2601 0.2559 0.2783 0.2744 0.2664 
N 510 510 510 510 510 510 
 Numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
The first column reports coefficients in the benchmark growth regression. The second to the sixth 
column report coefficients of one financial openness and all other control variables in the growth 
regression. 
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TABLE 1.2.  Dependent Variable: Real GDP per capita growth , estimated by 
Fixed Effects  
 FE1 FE2 FE3 FE4 FE5 FE6 
KAOPEN  0.3722     
  (0.2540)     
FDI Inflows   0.0062*    
   (0.0040)    
FDI Outflows    -0.0166***   
    (0.0040)   
Portfolio 
Assets 
    -0.0170***  
     (0.0040)  
Portfolio 
Liabilities 
     -0.0434*** 
      (0.0110) 
Terms of 
Trade 
-0.0087** -0.0091*** -0.0083** -0.0080** -0.0082** -0.0076** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.0188*** 0.0182*** 0.0175*** 0.0334*** 0.0311*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Initial 
Income 
0.2852 0.2376 0.3118 0.2883 0.3431 0.1155 
 (1.0220) (1.0210) (1.0200) (1.0060) (1.0060) (1.0060) 
Schooling 0.0389 0.0404 0.0407 0.0181 0.0086 0.0125 
 (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0280) 
Government 
Expense 
-0.0047 -0.0233 0.0078 0.0369 0.0188 -0.0207 
 (0.0960) (0.0970) (0.0970) (0.0960) (0.0950) (0.0950) 
Domestic 
Credit 
-0.0416*** -0.0423*** -0.0410*** -0.0470*** -0.0454*** -0.0432*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Constant 2.408 3.0624 1.7816 2.0014 2.3579 4.0901 
 (6.6170) (6.6240) (6.6140) (6.5170) (6.5160) (6.5220) 
Adjusted R 
square 
0.269 0.2724 0.2735 0.2928 0.2928 0.2944 
N 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
The first column reports coefficients in the benchmark growth regression. The second to the sixth 
column report coefficients of one financial openness and all other control variables in the growth 
regression. 
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TABLE 1.3.  Dependent Variable: Real GDP per capita growth , estimated 
by System GMM 
 GMM1 GMM2 GMM3 GMM4 GMM5 GMM6 
KAOPEN  0.3683     
  (0.2500)     
FDI Inflows   0.0068    
   (0.0040)    
FDI Outflows    -0.0090**   
    (0.0040)   
Portfolio 
Assets 
    -0.0090**  
     (0.0040)  
Portfolio 
Liabilities 
     -0.0082*** 
      (0.0030) 
Initial 
Income 
0.2644*** 0.3151*** 0.2662*** 0.2545*** 0.3080*** 0.3127*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0350) (0.0360) 
Terms of 
Trade 
-0.0226*** -0.0167** -0.0226*** -0.0233*** -0.0174*** -0.0162** 
 (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Trade 
Openness 
0.0192*** 0.0155*** 0.0141** 0.0259*** 0.0256*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0050) 
Schooling -0.0195 0.0091 -0.0134 -0.0207 0.0093 0.0109 
 (0.0230) (0.0160) (0.0240) (0.0230) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
Government 
Expense 
-0.1492* -0.101 -0.1598* -0.1191 -0.0792 -0.1102 
 (0.0820) (0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0830) (0.0840) (0.0830) 
Domestic 
Credit 
-0.0664*** -0.0523*** -0.0639*** -0.0674*** -0.0521*** -0.0508*** 
 (0.0100) (0.0090) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0090) (0.0090) 
N 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
The first column reports coefficients in the benchmark growth regression. The second to the sixth 
column report coefficients of one financial openness and all other control variables in the growth 
regression. 
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TABLE 1.4.  Dependent Variable: Real GDP per capita growth, estimated by 
TSLS 
 TSLS1 TSLS2 TSLS3 TSLS4 TSLS5 TSLS6 
KAOPEN  -0.6829     
  (1.3320)     
FDI Inflows   0.0077    
   (0.0070)    
FDI Outflows    -0.0791**   
    (0.040)   
                ̂      -0.0297  
     (0.0430)  
                     ̂       -0.0353 
      (0.0720) 
Terms of 
Trade 
-0.0058 -0.0060 -0.0082 -0.0038 -0.0074 -0.0610 
 (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0080) (0.0070) (0.013) (0.0160) 
             ̂  0.2631*** 0.2568** 0.2502*** 0.2309*** 0.0927** 0.0867* 
 (0.1210) (0.1190) (0.0960) (0.0840) (0.0450) (0.0430) 
Initial 
Income 
0.1282 0.1207 0.1200 0.1353 0.2560 0.2640 
 (0.1450) (0.1450) (0.1440) (0.1360) (0.1260) (0.1650) 
Schooling 0.0479 0.0457 0.0480 0.0474 0.0707 0.0507 
 (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0610) (0.0480) (0.0870) 
Government 
Expense 
-0.0119 -0.0125 -0.0229 -0.0193 -0.0536 -0.0212 
 (0.1400) (0.1410) (0.1550) (0.1640) (0.1340) (0.1470) 
Domestic 
Credit 
-0.0770*** -0.0764*** -0.0729*** -0.0644*** -0.0726** -0.0731*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0200) (0.0170) (0.0190) (0.0150) 
N 510 510 510 510 510 510 
       
Underid Test 0.2415 0.3741 0.1895 0.2722 0.4872 0.4814 
Weak id 0.2331 0.3532 0.1336 0.2642 0.61 0.57 
Hansen J  0.2672 0.3113 0.3831 0.2285 0.5292 0.4883 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
The second column reports coefficients in the benchmark growth regression. The third to the seventh 
column report coefficients of one financial openness and all other control variables in the growth 
regression. 
Note: In TSLS1-TSLS4 regressions, the instrumented variable is trade openness and the excluded 
instruments are one lag of US real effective exchange rate and EUR real effective exchange rate. 
In TSLS5 regression, the instrumented variables are trade openness and portfolio assets; the excluded 
instruments are one lag of US real effective exchange rate , one lag EUR real effective exchange rate, 
one lag of US real Interest rate, and one lag of EUR real Interest rate. 
In TSLS6 regression, the instrumented variables are trade openness and portfolio liabilities; the 
excluded instruments are one lag of US real effective exchange rate , one lag EUR real effective 
exchange rate, one lag of US real Interest rate, and one lag of EUR real Interest rate. 
Note: Last three rows of the table present p values of under-identification test, weak i, and Hansen J 
(over-identification test). All test statistics are heteroskedasticity-robust. 
Underid: H0: underidentified 
Weak id: H0:equation is weakly identified 
Hansen J: H0: overidentified test 
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TABLE 2.  Estimations comparison: All countries, countries without China, and 
countries without Japan 
 All China 
excluded 
Japan 
excluded 
KAOPEN 0.3722 0.3669 0.3452 
 (0.2540) (0.2580) (0.2600) 
FDI Inflows 0.0062* 0.0062* 0.0058 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
FDI Outflows -0.0166*** -0.0161*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Portfolio Assets -0.0170*** -0.0167*** -0.0173*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Portfolio Liabilities -0.0434*** -0.0432*** -0.0443*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0110) 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.1. Interactive Effect- Trade Openness - for all sample countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth  
Financial Openness 
Proxies 
FO FO*TradeOpen 
ness 
TradeOpenness 
      
KAOPEN 1.0570*** 0.0096*** 0.0236*** 
  (0.3130) (0.0030) (0.0070) 
FDI Inflows 0.0211*** 0.0001* 0.0163*** 
  (0.0070) (0.0000) (0.0060) 
FDI Outflows -0.0599*** 0.0001*** 0.0152** 
  (0.0220) (0.0000) (0.0060) 
Portfolio Assets -0.0620*** 0.0001*** 0.0132** 
  (0.0220) (0.0000) (0.0050) 
Portfolio Liabilities -0.0777** 0.0002* 0.0117** 
  (0.0310) (0.0000) (0.0060) 
Numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 3.2. Interactive Effect- Initial Income - for all sample countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
Financial Openness Proxies FO FO*Initial Income Initial Income 
KAOPEN 5.1713*** -0.6919*** -1.6427** 
  (1.2530) (0.1770) (0.8080) 
FDI Inflows 0.1770*** -0.0333*** -0.3505 
  (0.0290) (0.0070) (0.8960) 
FDI Outflows -0.3683** 0.0142 -1.3267* 
  (0.1660) (0.0160) (0.7920) 
Portfolio Assets -0.2172 0.0218 -1.2922 
  (0.2480) (0.0270) (0.7910) 
Portfolio Liabilities -0.1327 0.0096 -1.2286 
  (0.2080) (0.0230) (0.7910) 
Numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.3. Interactive Effect- Schooling - for all sample countries Dependent 
variable: real GDP per capita growth 
Numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financial Openness Proxies FO FO*Schooling Schooling 
KAOPEN 2.0950*** -0.0354*** 0.0201 
  (0.4820) (0.0080) (0.0430) 
FDI Inflows 0.0694*** -0.0010*** 0.0575 
  (0.0220) 0.0000  (0.0500) 
FDI Outflows -0.0002 -0.0002 0.038 
  (0.0500) (0.0010) (0.0500) 
Portfolio Assets 0.0315 -0.0006 0.0317 
  (0.0450) (0.0010) (0.0490) 
Portfolio Liabilities 0.1327** -0.0021 0.032 
  (0.0640) (0.0020) (0.0460) 
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TABLE 3.4. Interactive Effect- Government Expenses - for all sample countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
Financial Openness Proxies FO FO*Gov. Expenses Gov. Expenses 
      
KAOPEN 1.3976*** -0.1223** -0.0872 
  (0.5300) (0.0560) (0.1350) 
FDI Inflows 0.0246 -0.0027 0.0738 
  (0.0170) (0.0020) (0.1250) 
FDI Outflows 0.0231 -0.0039 0.0624 
  (0.0220) (0.0020) (0.1120) 
Portfolio Assets 0.0342 -0.0033 0.0492 
  (0.0230) (0.0020) (0.1040) 
Portfolio Liabilities 0.0126 -0.0064 0.0166 
  (0.0580) (0.0060) (0.1070) 
Numbers in parenthesis are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.5. Interactive Effect- Domestic Credit - for all sample countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
Financial Openness Proxies FO FO*Domestic 
Credit 
Domestic Credit 
KAOPEN 0.6842 -0.0074 0.0125 
  (0.5590) (0.0050) (0.0110) 
FDI Inflows 0.0386** -0.0003** 0.0177* 
  (0.0160) (0.0001) (0.0100) 
FDI Outflows -0.0223 0.0001 0.0066 
  (0.0320) (0.0000) (0.0120) 
Portfolio Assets -0.0200** 0.0013 0.007 
  (0.0080) (0.0020) (0.0120) 
Portfolio Liabilities -0.0208 -0.0006 0.0083 
  (0.0350) (0.0010) (0.0130) 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
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TABLE 3.6. Interactive Effect- Terms of Trade - for all sample countries 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth 
Financial Openness Proxies FO FO*Terms of 
Trade 
Terms of Trade 
      
KAOPEN 0.1270** 0.0144*** 0.0111 
  (0.0745) (0.0050) (0.0090) 
FDI Inflows -0.0760*** 0.0013*** -0.006 
  (0.0250) (0.0001) (0.0040) 
FDI Outflows -0.1335** 0.0012* -0.0061 
  (0.0600) (0.0010) (0.0040) 
Portfolio Assets -0.0166* -0.0008 -0.0057 
  (0.0100) (0.0010) (0.0040) 
Portfolio Liabilities -0.2539*** 0.0022*** -0.0068** 
  (0.0590) (0.0010) (0.0030) 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3.7.   Interactive Effect across Financial Liberalization indicators 
Financial 
Openness 
Proxies 
FO*Trade 
Openness 
FO*Initial 
Income 
FO*Schooling FO*Gov. 
Expenses 
FO*Domestic 
Credit 
FO*Terms 
of Trade 
KAOPEN 0.0096*** -
0.6919*** 
-0.0354*** -
0.1223** 
-0.0074 0.0144*** 
  (0.0030) (0.1770) (0.0080) (0.0560) (0.0050) (0.0050) 
FDI 
Inflows 
0.0001* -
0.0333*** 
-0.0010*** -0.0027 -0.0003** 0.0013*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0070) 0.0000  (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
FDI 
Outflows 
0.0001*** 0.0142 -0.0002 -0.0039 0.0001 0.0012* 
  (0.0000) (0.0160) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0010) 
Portfolio 
Assets 
0.0001*** 0.0218 -0.0006 -0.0033 0.0013 -0.0008 
  (0.0000) (0.0270) (0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0010) 
Portfolio 
Liabilities 
0.0002* 0.0096 -0.0021 -0.0064 -0.0006 0.0022*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0230) (0.0020) (0.0060) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Dependent variable: real GDP per capita growth  
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*, **, and *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% level of statistical significance, respectively. 
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7. List of Charts 
Chart A1: Real GDP per capita growth from 1980-2010 by countries 
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Appendix 
TABLE B. Literature review 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyrights 
Copyright for this article is retained by the author(s), with first publication rights granted to 
the journal. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0). 
 
